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We examine the effect of unions on the earnings of health care workers, with emphasis 
on the measurement and sources of union wage premiums. Using data constructed 
from the 1973 though 1994 Current Population Surveys, standard union premium 
estimates are found to be substantially lower among workers in health care than in 
other sectors of the economy, and to be smaller among higher skill than among lower 
skill occupational groups. Longitudinal analysis of workers switching union status, 
which controls for worker-specific skills, indicates a small impact of unions on earn­
ings within both high and low skilled health care occupations. Evidence is found for 
small, but significant, union threat effects in health care labor markets. It has been 
argued that recent legal changes in bargaining unit determination should enhance 
union organizing and bargaining power. Although we cannot rule this out, such 
effects are not readily apparent in our data. 
I. Introduction 
During the last decade, registered nurses (RNs) and, to a lesser extent, other health 
care personnel have realized significant wage gains relative to similar workers outside 
the health care sector. Not well understood is the role of labor unions in the determi­
nation of earnings in health care labor markets. Past estimates of union-nonunion 
wage differentials suggest that union premiums are rather small (Adamache and 
Sloan, 1982; Bruggink et al., 1985; Cain et al., 1981; Feldman and Scheffler, 1982). 
Recent changes in the interpretation of labor law by the NLRB, however, have raised 
the possibility of increased union activity and bargaining power among health care 
workers. The growth of managed care, which has focused attention on staffing and 
labor costs (e.g., Rosenthal, 1996), has generated renewed interest among health care 
workers in union representation. Moreover, the AFL-CIO has recently indicated that 
the health care industry will be a major focus of its organizing efforts. Understanding 
the past impact of unions in health care labor markets, therefore, is crucial for assess­
ing prospects for the future. 
One of the more comprehensive studies on unions in health care labor markets 
is by Cain et al. (1981), who focus exclusively on hospitals. The authors utilize three 
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alternative data sets: the Current Population Surveys for May 1973-1976, four Indus­
try Wage Surveys between 1966 and 1975, and the 1976 Guide of the American Hos­
pital Association, supplemented with a survey conducted by the authors. Cain et al. 
find small union-nonunion wage differentials among hospital employees in general, 
with about a 3 percent premium among private sector RNs. They also examine the 
possibility of union threat effects, finding evidence that unions increase the wages of 
both union and nonunion workers. Their hospital data suggest that a doubling of 
union density among private sector non-professional workers from 20 to 40 percent 
would increase both union and nonunion wages by 5 to 1 3  percentage points. 
Other studies have found smaller union premiums for nurses than for lower 
skilled health care occupations, and lower premiums for hospital workers than for 
similar workers in nonhealth care settings. For example, Feldman and Scheffler 
(1982) examined how the union premium changes with age of the union and found 
that membership in a union less than eight years old increases RN wages by about 
6 percent and licensed practical nurse (LPN) wages by about 8 percent (membership 
in older unions resulted in larger differentials). Secretaries and housekeepers, in con­
trast, realized premiums of about 13 percent. Hirsch and Schumacher (1995) obtained 
union premiums for all RNs of about 3 percent (and for hospital RNs about 2 per­
cent), while for LPNs and nursing aides they obtained union premium estimates of 
4.6 and 1 2.4 percent. With the exception of Hirsch and Schumacher, whose focus is 
on monopsony and not the union wage premium, these studies utilized data sets from 
the 1970s, focused on a narrow geographic area, or are limited by small sample sizes. 
None of the previous studies employed panel data to estimate union premiums. 
We examine the role of unions in health care labor markets, with a special 
emphasis on nursing.l Using data from 1973 through 1994, we provide evidence 
showing the extent of unionization, changes over time in union organizing activity, 
the magnitude of the union wage premium, and the effect of union density on union 
and nonunion wages for selected occupations in the health care industry. Sources of 
the union premium are then examined. By utilizing the longitudinal structure of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) the union-nonunion differential is decomposed into 
a part representing an equalizing differential for (otherwise unmeasured) worker 
skill, and a part representing rents, enhancing our understanding of the source of the 
union wage differential. The paper provides an updated analysis of the role of unions 
in health care labor markets, examines how changes in labor law have influenced the 
bargaining power of health care unions, and provides insight into the possible effects 
of the AFL-CIO's planned focus on organization in the health care sector. 
Two standard findings in the empirical literature are that economy-wide union 
wage differentials are substantially lower for high-skilled workers than for low-skilled 
workers (Lewis, 1986; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998) and that unionism is associated 
with lower wage dispersion (Freeman, 1980). Due to their representative nature and 
the political process within a union, the goals and actions of a union are likely to favor 
preferences of members with median preferences and, similarly, "average" workers 
are more likely to be organized. Because of contractual wage standardization, imply-
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ing less individual-based wage dispersion, workers with high ability find unions less 
attractive since they may earn higher wages in the nonunion sector. Those with low 
ability have difficulty acquiring union jobs since queues for these jobs allow employ­
ers to be selective (Abowd and Farber, 1982). The implication of differential matching 
in union and nonunion jobs is that in lower skilled occupations, union establishments 
will tend to hire relatively high-ability workers, as compared to nonunion establish­
ments. In high-skill occupations, union work sites will attract workers with relatively 
low ability, as compared to nonunion work sites. The implications of this type of 
labor market sorting for the measurement of union wage premiums among health 
care workers will be examined. 
In the next section, we present detailed cross-sectional evidence on union­
nonunion wage differentials and the effects of union density on union and nonunion 
wages among RNs, health technicians, and health service workers. Section III pro­
vides longitudinal wage change analysis that permits a decomposition of the union 
premium into skill- and nonskill-related components. We review in Section IV recent 
changes in labor law relating to the health care sector and provide descriptive evi­
dence on union organizing and membership density. Conclusions follow in Section V 
II. Cross-Sectional Evidence on the Union Premium 
Data and Descriptive Evidence. Our cross-sectional data are drawn from the May 
CPS for 1973 through 1981, and the monthly CPS Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) 
earnings files for January 1983 through December 1994. Between 1973 and 1978 the 
earnings supplement was conducted once a year in May, but all persons in the sample 
were administered the questions. In 1979, a half sample of the May CPS contains 
both earnings and union information, while only quarter samples are available for 
1980 and 1981. There was no union question in 1982. Beginning in 1983, union status 
questions were added to the earnings supplement administered each month to a quar­
ter sample (i.e., the outgoing rotation groups) of the CPS (monthly earnings supple­
ments, absent the union status questions, began in January 1979). 
Included in our sample are employed wage and salary workers ages 18 or over 
whose major activity in the week prior to the survey was not schooling. The wage is 
calculated as usual weekly earnings on the primary job (inclusive of tips, commis­
sions, and overtime) divided by usual hours worked per week. For those small num­
ber of workers whose weekly earnings are top-coded (at $999 through 1988 and 
$1,923 beginning in 1989), we assign the estimated mean earnings above the cap 
based on the assumption that the upper tail is characterized by a Pareto distribution. 2 
We omit from the sample workers with implicit hourly earnings of less than $1 or 
more than $99.99 December 1994 dollars. Further sample restrictions, discussed sub­
sequently, are imposed for the longitudinal analysis. 
In Table 1, descriptive data are presented on mean real wages (in December 
1994 dollars) by union status, union membership density, and the unadjusted union­
nonunion log wage differential. These figures are provided for a pooled 1973-1994 
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Table 1 
Mean Real Wages, Union Density, and the Unadjusted Union Wage Gap 
by Occupation 
Wu WN Density InW0-InWN N 
Health Care Workers: 
Registered Nurses 18.00 16.43 0.157 0.096 38,555 
Health Technicians 13.11 12.18 0.106 0 .090 29,594 
Health Service 9.73 7.88 0.141 0.223 45,044 
Occupations 
Non-Health Workers in Health Industry: 
School;:: 16 15.72 14.23 0.095 0.144 11,576 
13 $School$ 15 11.38 9.88 0.085 0.160 16,324 
School $12 10.09 8.50 0 .114 0.185 38,334 
Non-Health Workers Outside Health Industry: 
School2: 16 17.77 17.57 0 .210 0.094 316,194 
13 $School$ 15 14.43 11.43 0.114 0.283 250,172 
School $12 12.50 9.24 0 .128 0.342 507,847 
Notes: Data ate from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORG files for 1983-1994. Union data ate 
not available in the CPS for 1982. Wu and WN ate real wages (in December 1994 dollats) for union and nonunion 
workers, respectively. Density is the percentage of workers covered by a union contract. The unadjusted log wage 
differential is represented by ln Wu-ln WN, and N is the sample size. Health Technicians include clinical laboratory 
technologists and technicians, dental hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic techni­
cians, licensed practical nurses, and health technologists and technicians n.e.c. Health Service Occupations 
include dental assistants, health aides, except nursing and nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants. 
sample of three groups of health care workers based on high, medium, and low levels 
of skill. The groups are, respectively, registered nurses, health technologists and tech­
nicians, and health service occupations.3 For comparison, we also construct two sets 
of comparison groups in non-health occupations, one working within and the other 
outside the health care sector. These comparison groups consist of workers in the 
following broad occupational categories (with health occupations excluded): profes­
sional specialty occupations; technicians and related support; sales, administrative 
support, and clerical; and service occupations (except protective and household ser­
vices). For example, secretarial and clerical workers employed in hospitals or the 
offices of physicians would be included in the health care sector control groups, 
while those employed outside the health care sector would be in the larger non-health 
care sector comparison groups. The groups are segmented by skill based on educa­
tion. For a comparison to RNs, we select those with at least a 4-year college degree. 
For health technicians we select a medium skill comparison group of those with 
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some college but not a 4-year degree, while for the health service occupations we 
select a lower skill comparison group that includes those with 12 years of schooling 
or less. 
Over the 1973-1994 sample period, 15.7 percent of RNs are union members, 
with unionized RN wages .096 log points higher than among nonunion workers. 4 
Among the health technician sample, union density is lower and the unadjusted 
union wage gap is similar to that of RNs. By contrast, the unadjusted union differen­
tial of .223 among the lower skilled health service workers (e.g., nursing aides) is 
more than double that for RNs and technicians. Among non-health workers within 
the health care sector, we find a similar pattern to that of the nursing groups, 
although there is less variation across schooling levels. The large control groups of 
workers in non-health occupations employed outside the health care sector display 
the expected skill pattern of union premiums. The comparison group of college grad­
uates has an unadjusted log wage gap of .094, as compared to .283 among the group 
with some college and .342 among those with a high school degree or less. With the 
exception of the high-skilled group, the descriptive evidence is consistent with rela­
tively weaker union effects within health care than outside the health care sector. 
The Cross-Sectional Union Differential. Table 2 displays regression estimates of 
union premiums for three groups of workers - health care workers (in tum divided 
into RNs, health technicians, and health service workers), workers in non-health 
occupations employed in health service industries, and non-health workers outside 
the health service sector. The latter two worker comparison groups are in turn 
divided into high-, medium-, and low-skill groups, proxied by completed years of 
schooling. The union-nonunion wage differential is estimated from a pooled log 
wage equation, with the coefficient on a membership dummy measuring the pre­
mium.5 The regressions include a dummy for hospital employment (for the health 
service industries samples), plus controls for years of schooling, potential experience 
and its square, and dummy variables for gender, race, marital status (2), part-time 
status, large metropolitan area, region (8), and year (14).6 
Union wage effects are relatively small in the health care sector, similar to find­
ings from most previous studies based on alternative data sources and earlier years. 
Following control for measurable characteristics, unionized RNs receive wages .032 
log points higher than "similar" nonunion RNs. Unionized health technicians realize 
a .049 log point premium, while the differential within health service occupations is 
.114 log points. Workers in non-health occupations employed in the health care sec­
tor display union wage differentials of .049, .075, and .106 log points for the high-, 
medium-, and low-skill groups. Among the large comparison groups of non-health 
workers outside the health care sector, estimated union premiums are .031, .154, and 
.193 log points among the high-, medium-, and low-skill (schooled) groups. 
Table 2 also presents the wage differentials associated with hospital employment 
for the health care workers and non-health workers employed in the health care sec­
tor. Among all health and, to a lesser extent, non-health care occupations, hospital 
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Table 2 
Union and Hospital Log Wage Advantage for Health Care 
and Non-Health Workers 
Health Care Workers: 
Registered Nurses 
Health Technicians 
Health Service 
Occupations 
Union 
0.032 
(0.005) 
0.049 
(0.007) 
0 .114 
(0 .005) 
Non-Health Workers in Health Industry: 
School<: 16 
13 S SchoolS 15 
SchoolS 12 
0.049 
(0.015) 
0.075 
(0.010) 
0.106 
(0.006) 
Non-Health Workers outside Health Industry: 
School<: 16 
13 S SchoolS 15 
SchoolS 12 
0.031 
(0.002) 
0.154 
(0.003) 
0 .193 
(0.002) 
Hospital 
0.159 
(0.004) 
0.067 
(0.004) 
0 .146 
(0.0 04) 
0.087 
(0.008) 
0.067 
(0.005) 
0.095 
(0.003) 
Notes: Data ate from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORG files 
for 1983-1994. Estimates are based on union and hospital coefficients from 
wage level regressions with In W as the dependent variable. Other variables 
included in the regressions ate yeats of schooling. potential experience and its 
squate, dummies for public employment, race (2), gender, marital status (2), 
latge metropolitan atea, part-time status, region (8) and yeat (14). The compari­
son group regressions included 4 occupational dummy variables. Full regres­
sion results for the nursing groups ate presented in Appendix I. Standatd errors 
ate in patentheses. 
employees realize a wage advantage relative to non-hospital employees. The hospital 
premium is particularly large among RNs. Elsewhere we have shown that the hospi­
tal premium for RNs results from a combination of higher unmeasured skills among 
hospital nurses, more demanding working conditions, and, more problematically, 
receipt of quasi-rents during a period of increasing employment (Schumacher and 
Hirsch, 1997). 
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In Appendix 1, wage equation coefficients on other variables are shown for the 
three health service groups. Schooling coefficients are relatively small within the nar­
rowly defined occupational groups, since these reflect only within-occupation rates of 
return. Black health sector workers earn less than white workers, with the racial gap 
here being somewhat larger than the economy-wide gap observed among women (but 
not men). Although male workers earn a substantial premium in non-health-related 
occupations, differences in wages by gender within health occupations are small. In 
contrast to the large penalty for part-time workers in non-health occupations, there is 
little or no difference in wages between full-time and part-time health care workers. 
Although our analysis focuses on wages, note that unions affect fringe benefits as 
well. In results not shown we examine fringe benefits by utilizing the March CPS sup­
plements, which contain data on pensions and health insurance coverage. Consistent 
with economy-wide evidence (Freeman, 1981), we find among all the health (and 
non-health) occupations a greater likelihood among union than nonunion workers 
that the employer will both offer a pension and that the worker will participate. Simi­
lar to the evidence on wages, union-nonunion differences in pensions are larger for 
lower skilled than higher skilled occupational groups. Union workers also are more 
likely than nonunion workers to be offered health insurance and, among those 
offered insurance, to have part of the premium paid by the employer. 
In this section we have seen that union wage differentials in the health care sec­
tor are small in both absolute terms and relative to the differentials found among the 
comparison groups of workers. Union power is typically displayed through both 
increased membership and wages, although wage premiums and membership are 
inversely related for a given level of union power (e.g., a movement along a labor 
demand constraint versus an outward shift of the constraint). W hile health care 
unions have union density levels not dissimilar from their comparison groups, their 
apparent small effect on wages suggests that bargaining power is limited. Prior to 
concluding that bargaining power in health care markets is weak, however, one must 
examine the effects of unions on nonunion wages. 
Union Threat Effects. The evidence to this point suggests that unionized RNs 
earn about 3-4 percent higher wages than similar nonunion RNs. It cannot be 
assumed, however, that the absence of unions would cause average RN wages to con­
verge to the current nonunion level, since unions have a potential influence on 
nonunion as well as union wages. The union impact on nonunion wages can be classi­
fied into labor spillover, demand, and union threat effects. Spillover and demand 
effects result in lower wages in the nonunion sector due, in the former case, to a 
wage-induced movement of employment out of the union and into the nonunion sec­
tor, and in the latter, to decreased industry demand for all inputs in the event that 
industry-wide product prices increase. Threat effects, however, produce a positive 
relationship between nonunion wages and union density, as nonunion employers 
increase wages to deter organizing. Evidence on the effect of unions on nonunion 
wages typically reveals the dominance of threat effects, as evinced by a positive rela­
tionship of nonunion wages and industry union density, while finding little evidence 
132 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH 
for large spillover or demand effects on nonunion wages (Hirsch and Addison, 1986; 
for contrasting evidence, see Neumark and Wachter, 1995). 
In order to examine the effect of unionization on the wages of nonunion health 
professionals, we examine how wages vary with local labor market health care union 
density. Beginning with the October 1985 CPS, the Census identified 202 Metropoli­
tan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with populations of 100,000 or more (the largest areas 
are Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas). Here, we assign each worker in the 
CPS to one of 252 market areas - the 202 MSAs plus 50 nonmetropolitan state 
groups. We then calculate area-specific union densities for the entire health care sec­
tor over the October 1985 to December 1994 period, allowing these values to proxy 
relative inter-area differences in health care union organizing strength (similar results 
are obtained when we delete observations where cell sizes are small). 
Table 3 presents the individual union dummy and area union density coeffi­
cients (the latter interacted with individual union status) from log wage equations for 
the three groups of health care workers. The results indicate rather clear-cut union 
threat effects, with a tendency toward stronger density effects on nonunion than 
union wages and stronger threat effects among lower skilled health occupations than 
among RNs. For example, a unionized RN in a labor market with 25 percent union 
density will have wages .014 log points higher than a unionized RN in a market with 
5 percent union density (a density effect of .068 times .20). Wages for nonunion RNs 
Table 3 
Union Threat Effects 
Union U*Den N*Den p-value 
Registered Nurses 0.044 0.068 0 .127 0.233 
(0.012) (0.046) (0.030) 
Health Technicians 0 .049 0.198 0 .250 0 .441 
(0.017) (0.067) (0.036) 
Health Service Occupations 0 .124 0.204 0.297 0.073 
(0.014) (0.051) (0.029) 
Non-Health Workers in 0.074 0.327 0.252 0.130 
Health Care Industry (0.013) (0.049) (0.024) 
Notes: Data are from the October 1985-December 1994 CPS ORG files. U*Den and N*Den are coefficients on union 
density interacted with union and nonunion status, respectively. Union density is calculated for health industry 
sector workers in 202 standard metropolitan statistical areas and 50 non-MSA state areas. The p-value is for the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on density are equal for union and nonunion members. Other variables included in 
the regressions are schooling, potential experience and its square, and dummies for marital status (2), gender, race 
(2), region (8), large metropolitan area, part-time status, and year (7). Regressions for health care workers include 
a dummy for hospital employment. 
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will be an estimated .025 higher in the more unionized labor market. Union threat 
effects for health technicians and other health service occupations are substantially 
larger, as are union wage premiums. In short, estimated union-nonunion wage differ­
entials understate the total impact of labor unions on the wages of union and 
nonunion health care personnel. In results not shown, we find that union density 
effects were stronger after 1991 than prior to 1991 (e.g., a 20 percent increase in 
union density would increase nonunion wages by about 2 percent before and 3 per­
cent after 1991). The year 1991 is significant because that is when the Supreme Court 
affirmed the NLRB 's rulemaking policy with respect to hospital bargaining units. 
Changes in the legal framework are discussed later. 
III. Longitudinal Analysis of the Union Premium 
The cross-sectional estimates of health sector union wage premiums reported above 
are similar to those found in previous studies based on less recent data. Prior studies, 
however, have not been able to evaluate whether the union-nonunion wage differen­
tial represents a rent to union workers or a compensating differential for unmeasured 
differences in skills. If worker skills are not adequately measured by the standard 
variables, and omitted human capital is correlated with union status, then the union 
coefficient will be a biased measure of the union premium (Brown, 1980). Jakubson 
(1991), among others, presents evidence that this is the case for the economy as a 
whole. In this section we use the panel structure of the CPS to determine the extent 
of such bias, and to obtain estimates of the union premium net of worker-specific 
skill differences. 
The Wage Change Model and CPS Panel Data. Below, we modify a standard log­
wage earnings equation to account for unmeasured worker-specific skill differences 
fixed over a one-year period. Letting Ij represent the fixed effect on log wages for 
worker i and adding a time subscript t, the log wage equation estimated above can be 
written as: 
(1) 
where ln ��is the log real wage of worker i in year t; X consists of variables (indexed 
by j) measuring personal and job related characteristics; f3 are the respective coeffi­
cients; UNION is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker is a union member 
while () is a measure of the union-nonunion log wage differential; and YEAR 
includes year dummies (indexed by y). The error term is divided into an individual­
specific quality component (Ij) assumed fixed over time (one year with our data) and 
a random, well behaved, component (ei1). If the omitted fixed effect is positively cor­
related with union status (i.e., more able workers are selected into union jobs), then 
estimates of the union wage premium from equation 1 are biased upward. 
Letting the symbol L1 represent changes between adjacent years, a wage change 
equation will take the form (dropping the individual subscript i): 
Llln\\J = 'i.f3jL1JS d + OLlUNIONd + 'i.rdPERIODd + Lled, (2) 
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where d indexes the time period over which changes are calculated, and PER/ODd 
are dummies for the periods 1984/5 through 1993/4 (with 1983/4 the reference 
period) which capture differences in real wage growth across years. In equation 2, 
the effects owing to unmeasured ability fall out, potentially allowing for unbiased 
estimates of the union premium, assuming that ability is equally valued at the margin 
by employers in both sectors (Gibbons and Katz, 1992) and within a year's time (i.e., 
skills are fully transferable). The estimate of the union premium is based on the 
change in wages for individuals who either switch into or out of union membership 
(we subsequently address the possibility of measurement error in the union change 
variable). If the union premium is due entirely to unions attracting higher ability 
workers, then the estimate of () in the wage change equation should be zero, assum­
ing marginal products are equivalent across sectors.? 
In order to estimate equation 2, panel data with observations on individuals in at 
least two periods are required. As described above, the CPS earnings supplement 
questions are asked of individuals in the same month for consecutive years (i.e., rota­
tion group 4 in year t and rotation group 8 in year t+ 1 ). CPS panels for the year-pairs 
1983/84 through 1993/94 provide unusually large files for longitudinal analysis, 
including sufficient numbers of union status switchers among nurses and other health 
professionals. Appendix 2 describes how the panel data set is constructed. Because 
the Census reinterviews households in fixed locations, individuals whose households 
move or who move out of a household during the year are not represented in the 
sample (young workers are most likely to be eliminated). In order to minimize mea­
surement error in the longitudinal sample, individuals for whom the Census has allo­
cated values of industry, occupation, earnings, or union status (the union allocation 
flag is available only since 1989) in either year t or t+l, and those few workers dis­
playing unusually large log wage changes (less than -1.0 or greater than 1.0), are 
deleted from the sample. The occupational samples (i.e., RNs, health technicians, 
and health service workers) include only workers employed in the same occupational 
category in both years, thus allowing us to focus on the wage effects associated with 
changes in union status. Although the longitudinal samples are not as representative 
of the employed labor force as are the cross-sectional samples, we obtain similar 
wage level equation results from the two samples. 
Wage Change Estimates of Union Premiums. Table 4 presents the results of the 
"fixed effects" or wage change regression models estimated for the three groups of 
health care workers and their respective comparison groups.8 For comparison, the 
first column presents the union coverage coefficient from a standard log wage regres­
sion estimated in levels using observations from the second year in the panel. These 
estimates are similar to wage level estimates presented in Table 1 based on the larger 
samples. The second column displays wage change results. For RNs, the already 
small coefficient on union status falls from .032 in the levels regression to .0 ll in the 
wage change regression. The results for the other two groups of health care workers 
suggest that much of the cross-sectional union differential is in fact a compensating 
differential for unmeasured worker skills. Estimated union premiums for health tech-
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Table 4 
Wage Change Regression Results 
Union 
t-Un ion 
Sample size 
Union 
t.Union 
Sample size 
Union 
t-Un ion 
Sample size 
Registered Nurses 
lnW 
0.032 
(0.009) 
7,583 
LllnW 
0.011 
(0.010) 
Health Technicians 
lnW 
0.042 
(0.015) 
4,743 
t.lnW 
0.0 14 
(0.0 14) 
Health Service Occs 
1nW 
0. 108 
(0.012) 
5,856 
�nW 
0.033 
(0.012) 
Comparison Group 
School� 16 
lnW 
0.064 
(0.008) 
33,624 
�nW 
0.071 
(0.019) 
Comparison Group 
13 �School� 15 
lnW 
0.174 
(0.006) 
36,268 
LllnW 
0.108 
(0.0 16) 
Comparison Group 
School� 12 
lnW 
0.228 
(0.004) 
69,792 
�nw 
0.098 
(0.011) 
Notes: Data are from the CPS ORO panels from 1983/4 to 1993/4 (see Appendix 2). Columns under lnW are levels 
regressions using the log real wage in the second year as the dependent variable. Columns under �In W are wage 
change regressions using the change in the log real wage as the dependent variable. The comparison group 
excludes workers in the health care sector; these regressions include dummies for changing occupation. The 
change in union coefficient reported for the control group is for those who reported changing union status as well 
as occupation and industry. Dummies for the three other types of union changes were also included. See text for a 
description of the comparison groups. Other variable in the regressions are the change in hospital status (for the 
health occupations), change in public employment, change in part-time status, change in experience squared, and 
9 period dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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nicians fall from .042 to .014 as we move from a wage level to wage change equa­
tion, while premiums among health service workers (e.g., nursing aids) fall from .108 
to .033. 
Were substantial measurement error in the union change variable not a real pos­
sibility, we would readily conclude that much of what is an already small wage 
advantage among unionized health care workers in fact reflects higher unmeasured 
skills among union than nonunion workers, rather than union bargaining power. 
Given that measurement error is likely to bias these coefficients toward zero, such a 
strong conclusion is not possible. More clear-cut is the finding that the longitudinal 
union estimates drop most sharply for the lower skilled health service group of work­
ers. The implication is that among lower wage occupations, union wage standardiza­
tion and employer selection lead to the matching of workers with high (unmeasured) 
skills into union jobs, as compared to nonunion workers with identical measured 
characteristics. What appears to be a substantial union premium among lower skill 
health care workers in fact largely reflects these differences in worker skills and not 
union bargaining power. Likewise, previous researchers have noted the particularly 
low union premiums for high-skilled health care workers, arguing that "nurses and 
other hospital workers may view collective bargaining as incompatible with the ethos 
of their professional mission, and where organized, they may be reluctant to exercise 
their bargaining power by traditional union pressure tactics" (Cain et al., p. 193). We 
offer a complementary explanation. Owing to within- and across-employer wage 
standardization, employers find it difficult to attract the most able RNs into union 
workplaces. 
The selection by skill type that is hinted at among health care workers is readily 
evident in the economy-wide comparison group sample (Hirsch and Schumacher, 
1998), where measurement error is not a major concern (see footnote 8). In contrast 
to the cross-sectional result of low union premiums among high-skill and large pre­
miums among low-skill workers, the longitudinal estimates indicate similar union 
premiums of about .07 to .11 log points, with far smaller differences across skill 
groups than suggested by standard wage level analysis. These results indicate that 
union employers are able to select relatively high quality union (as compared to 
nonunion) workers with low levels of measured skills, while the most able among 
workers with high measured skills are not likely to be in the union queue. In short, 
unionization is associated with a relatively compressed distribution of worker skills, 
as compared to the skill distribution among nonunion workers. 
IV. The Legal Structure and Changes over Time in Union Organizing 
and Density 
Our evidence indicates that unions have had rather modest effects on the wages of 
health care workers. This section identifies recent changes in the legal structure sur­
rounding union organizing in hospitals and examines possible implications of these 
changes. Prior to the mid-1970s, unionization in hospitals and much of the health 
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care sector was limited. Federal hospitals were first covered by the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) in January 1962 by Executive Order 10988. A series of cases 
decided by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1967 extended its juris­
diction to most private for-profit hospitals. The most important spur to union organiz­
ing was Public Law 93-360, passed on August 25, 1974, which brought voluntary 
nonprofit hospitals under coverage of the NLRA, while also including provisions that 
lengthened the strike notice period and required federal mediation of disputes. This 
law enabled the NLRB to conduct representation elections in hospitals and to man­
date good faith bargaining. Union activity increased substantially after the passage of 
Public Law 93-360. The number of hospitals with at least one collective bargaining 
agreement increased from 912 in 1974 to I ,635 in 1977 (Feldman and Scheffler, 
1982, p. 198). As seen in Table 5, elections in the health service industry increased 
from 248 in 1974, to 579 in 1975, and to a peak total of 746 in 1977 (NLRB Annual 
Reports). Union membership density in hospitals, based on our calculations from the 
CPS, increased from 13.0 percent in 1974, to 16.8 percent in 1981. Because the 
"flow" of new members from elections is typically small as compared to the "stock" 
of existing union employment, changes in organizing activity show up more rapidly 
in the NLRB election data than in the CPS union density figures. 
Because of concern about work stoppages, Congress included an admonition in 
the committee notes to Public Law 93-360 to prevent undue proliferation of bargain­
ing units in the health care industry (Mackender, 1992). They did not provide specific 
instructions, however, and the NLRB's approach to bargaining unit determination 
went through several stages. Initially the NLRB applied a "community-of-interest" 
doctrine to hospital bargaining units, attempting to group employees with similar 
functions and skills. Generally, the board recognized five units: registered nurses, 
other professionals, technical employees, service and maintenance workers, and busi­
ness-office clerical (NLRB, 1988). Employers challenged these definitions as too 
narrow and appeals courts frequently overturned NLRB decisions (Gullett and Kroll, 
1990). In a 1984 case (St. Francis II) the board adopted a "disparity of interest" test 
for unit determination (St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 953, 1984), permit­
ting larger disparities between wages, hours, and working conditions than previously 
allowed. This change resulted in essentially two bargaining units: professional and 
nonprofessional employees (NLRB, 1988). 
The decision in St. Francis II was appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which ruled that the NLRB erroneously applied the disparity of 
interest test. After the case was remanded to the Board, the NLRB moved to a "rule­
making" approach, and in 1989 the Board established eight bargaining units in the 
health care industry: physicians, registered nurses, professionals except physicians 
and registered nurses, technical employees, skilled maintenance employees, business 
office clerical employees, guards, and other nonprofessional employees (NLRB, 
1988). Psychiatric hospitals and nursing homes were not covered under the new rules 
and acceptable bargaining units in these sectors would be evaluated on a case-by­
case basis. The American Hospital Association filed suit seeking to permanently 
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enjoin the Board from enforcing the rule. The district court found the rules violated 
the congressional admonition to avoid undue proliferation and issued an injunction. 
The Seventh Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision arguing that the rule­
making approach was sufficiently broad. Finally in April 1991, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in a unanimous opinion making the rule 
enforceable by the Board (American Hospital Association v. NLRB, I l l  S. Ct. 1539, 
1991). Hence, the current standard is the rulemaking approach as outlined in 1989. 
It was expected that the 1 991 Supreme Court decision and the rulemaking 
approach to unit determination would strengthen union organization. Union represen­
tation is a collective good in that many of the services provided are nonrival and non­
excludable. That is, individual workers cannot be excluded from contract provisions 
covering layoffs, work rules, promotion or from commonly provided working condi­
tions (safety, hours of work, etc.). The more similar are employees' preferences 
within a bargaining unit, the lower the cost of organizing and the easier it is for a 
union to provide a mix of "services" that can gain and maintain majority support. 9 
Schwarz and Koziara (1992) have examined how bargaining units affect wages, 
strikes, and jurisdictional disputes in hospitals. They find little, if any, evidence that 
an increased number of bargaining units leads to higher wage settlements. Only 
where there are 5 or 6 units (which occurs only about 7 percent of the time) are RN 
wages significantly higher than hospitals with only one bargaining unit. Hospitals 
with more than 6 units do not have wages significantly higher than those with only 
one unit. They find no relationship between bargaining units and the wages of LPNs 
and other health care workers. 
Although it is difficult to evaluate the effects of NLRB unit determination on 
union organizing strength, there is little in the descriptive data presented in Table 5 
that would suggest a large impact, a finding consistent with the results in Schwarz 
and Koziara. The only obvious breaks in the union election series are the increase in 
elections following the 1974 passage of Public Law 93-360, and the sharp drop in 
elections after 1981. The latter, of course, was an economy-wide phenomenon (Chai­
son and Dhavale, 1991), as seen in Table 5 by a relatively constant proportion of 
health service to economy-wide representation elections. And, not surprisingly, there 
are no obvious changes in CPS union membership density among our three groups of 
health care workers that can be ascribed to labor law changes. 
Greater bargaining power may show up not only in increased membership, but 
also in larger union wage premiums or stronger union threat effects. We can mention 
briefly the results of estimating separate union wage premiums by time period (these 
results are not shown). For the health care sector as a whole, as well as for health 
technicians and workers in lower skill health service occupations, standard regression 
estimates of union wage premiums are remarkably stable over the 1973-1994 period. 
The one exception that we find is for hospital-based RNs, who realize an estimated 
union premium during the (pooled) 1992-1994 period of about 5 percent, as com­
pared to a premium of about 2-3 percent during earlier years. Such evidence is con­
sistent with enhanced bargaining power among hospital RNs following the Supreme 
Table 5 I� Union Organizing Activity and Membership Density in the Health Care Industry 
� 
Health Service Industry All Industries Union Density (%) ::I: -:::0 
Total %Union Total Total %Union Total Cll () 
Year Elections Wins Votes Cast Elections Wins Votes Cast Ratio RN HT HS ::I: 
§ 0.. 
1966 6 50.0 291 8,324 60.8 534,454 .001 - - tT1 
0 
1967 6 83.3 369 8,116 59.0 554,133 .001 - - - � 
1968 108 81.5 4,098 7,857 57.2 566,164 .014 - :::0 0 
135 62.2 7,993 526,419 .Ol7 
._ 
1969 4,714 54.6 - Cll 
1970 !53 64.1 6,680 8,074 55.2 531,402 .019 
() 
- - ::I: 
c:: 
1971 225 67.1 10,708 8,362 53.2 514,284 .027 - - - :s:: 
1972 250 62.0 10,818 8,923 53.6 519,477 .028 - fs 
::I: 
1973 254 64.6 12,826 9,369 51.1 480,303 .027 6.0 8.2 10.1 
tT1 
:::0 
1974 248 60.9 11,997 8,858 50.0 482,414 .028 8.0 9.6 12.4 
1975 579 59.8 41,828 8,577 48.2 501,996 .068 9.8 9.9 12.4 
1976 710 58.6 53,671 8,638 48.1 418,347 .082 12.1 8.1 13.8 
1977 746 54.7 58,947 9,484 46.0 504,241 .079 11.9 12.7 14.0 
1978 596 54.4 43,100 8,240 46.0 417,563 .072 15.0 12.0 14.1 
1979 528 53.0 40,482 8,043 45.0 506,040 .066 14.8 14.5 16.0 
1980 695 50.6 62,812 8,198 45.7 458,114 .085 19.7 9.5 13.6 
1981 653 52.5 55,591 7,512 43.1 392,157 .087 17.4 8.6 14.3 
I -
l;J 
'-0 
Table 5 - Continued 
,� 
Health Service Industry All Industries Union Density (%) 
Total %Union Total Total %Union Total 
Year Elections Wins Votes Cast Elections Wins Votes Cast Ratio RN HT HS 
1982 473 49.0 40,161 5,1 16 40.3 257,599 .092 
1983 378 54.8 28,923 4,405 43.0 181,305 .086 16.0 12. 1 15.6 
1984 386 56.2 28,741 4,436 42.0 22 1,023 .087 15.7 1 1.4 15.3 
1985 356 55.3 30,140 4,614 42.4 224,116 .077 15.1 10.0 14.4 
1986 373 50.9 30,837 4,520 43.2 229,239 .083 15.2 10.2 13.8 
1987 352 54.8 29,602 4,069 43.9 212,825 .087 15.5 9.6 13.5 
1988 342 53.8 29,257 4,153 46.3 214,092 .082 15.3 10.3 12.1 
1989 296 53.0 22,910 4,4 13 46.7 239,934 .067 16.3 10.4 12.8 
1990 367 56.7 30,124 4,210 46.7 229,242 .087 16.6 10.7 13.0 
199 1 342 52.3 25,3 13 3,752 44.3 195,876 .091 16.8 9.2 13.0 ...... 0 
1992 299 54.5 24,653 3,599 46.5 193,035 .083 15.8 10.4 13.4 
c 
� 
1993 324 58.3 26,24 1 3,586 47.6 20 1,557 .090 15.9 10.5 13.2 > r 
1994 - 17.9 10.5 14.3 0 "Tl 
r 
> 
Notes: Union elections data are from the National Labor Relations Board's Annual Reports 1966-1993, Table 16. Total Elections is the total number of elections in the fiscal year ending Oj 
September 30. % Union Wins is the percent of elections in which representative rights were won by unions, and Total Votes Cast is the total number of votes cast in the elections. 0 
Ratio is the ratio of health service industry union elections to total union elections in all industries. Union Density data are from the CPS ORO files. Union membership is not :;>;:! 
available for 1982. Health Technicians (HT) includes clinical laboratory technologists and technicians, dental hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic :;>;:! tr1 
technicians, licensed practical nurses, and health technologists and technicians n.e.c. Health Service Occupations (HS) include dental assistants, health aides except nursing, and IZl 
nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants. tr1 > 
:;>;:! 
(') 
:t 
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Court's 1991 decision. However, because the absolute levels of the premiums are low 
and the change over time is small relative to the standard error of the estimates, we 
are reluctant to attach heavy weight to such evidence. Likewise, we previously noted 
that estimated union threat effects (measured by the impact of local area union den­
sity on the wages of nonunion workers) show a small increase in the impact of 
unions on nonunion wages after 1991, again consistent with enhanced union power 
following the Supreme Court decision. Absent stronger evidence, we are reluctant to 
ascribe our wage results to the shift in NLRB rules on hospital organizing. A more 
conclusive determination of the effects of NLRB policy must await further evidence. 
V. Conclusions 
We have provided an analysis of union effects in health care labor markets. Consistent 
with previous research, we find that standard union wage premium estimates are sub­
stantially smaller for health care workers than for workers outside the health care 
sector, and are smaller among RNs than among lower skill health care workers. 
Longitudinal analysis controlling for worker-specific abilities also shows small union 
effects in health care markets. In contrast to the wage level evidence, longitudinal 
results indicate only small differences in union premiums across skill groups. Much 
of the observed union wage advantage among workers in lower skilled health occu­
pations is not a rent but, rather, compensation for high unmeasured skills. Wage pre­
miums create queues for union jobs and employers avoid hiring workers with very 
low skills. Because of union wage standardization and limited merit-based wage dis­
persion, however, workers who are most able are least likely to select union jobs. 
Thus, while high unmeasured skills owing to employer selection account for much of 
the union wage advantage among workers with low levels of measured skills, union­
nonunion differences in unmeasured skills are less important among workers with 
higher levels of measured skills. 
Taken together, our evidence indicates that labor union effects on wages in health 
care labor markets are small, regardless of whether they are estimated in levels or 
changes. During the 1980s health care expenditures were rising rapidly, and the earn­
ings of health care workers (especially RNs) were increasing in both real and relative 
terms. Despite the favorable economic climate, unions had a rather modest impact on 
the earnings of union and nonunion health care workers. We find no clear-cut evidence 
of a large impact from recent changes in bargaining unit determination within hospi­
tals, although our results hint at some increased union bargaining power after 1991. 
W hile it is difficult to predict what will occur over the next several years, our 
results suggest that the AFL-CIO's attempts to organize in the health care industry 
will have limited success. The increased competitiveness of the health care sector 
and a slowdown in demand growth for hospital-based health care workers suggest 
that union organizing ability and bargaining power may in fact diminish. If unions 
were unable to obtain significant wage gains for their members in an economic envi­
ronment relatively conducive to bargaining, it is unlikely that the union impact will 
increase in a more competitive environment. In the short run unions may be effective 
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in maintaining existing wages levels for their members, and union-nonunion wage 
differentials may increase owing to greater downward wage flexibility among 
nonunion health care workers. Likewise, increased risks of job and wage loss accom­
panying changes in health delivery systems may increase worker interest in organiz­
ing. In the long run, however, sizable union wage premiums will be difficult to 
sustain. The ultimate role of unions in a more competitive health care sector will 
hinge on the degree of cooperation and conflict in the labor relations environment, 
the relative productivity of union and nonunion establishments, and the success of 
human resource practices that prevail in union and nonunion work sites.10 
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Appendix 1 
Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
Registered Health 
Nurses Technicians 
Union Membership 0.032 0.049 
(0.005) (0.007) 
Hospital 0.159 0.067 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Public 0.019 -0.014 
(0.004) (0.006) 
Schooling 0.033 0.074 
(0.001) (0.00 1) 
Experience 0.013 0.018 
(0.001) (0.00 1) 
Exr!wo -0.027 -0.033 
(0.00 1) (0.00 1) 
Black -0.095 -0.055 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Male 0.028 0.070 
(0.008) (0.006) 
Married, Spouse 0.015 0.057 
Present (0.005) (0.006) 
Divorced, Separated, 0.015 0.028 
or Widowed (0.006) (0.007) 
Large Metropolitan Area 0. 102 0.099 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Part-Time Status 0.007 0.002 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Adj. R2 0.187 0.222 
Sample Size 38,555 29,594 
Health 
Service 
Occs 
0.114 
(0.005) 
0. 146 
(0.004) 
0.067 
(0.005) 
0.04 1 
(0.00 1) 
0.01 1 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.001) 
-0.078 
(0.004) 
0.045 
(0.006) 
0.069 
(0.005) 
0.026 
(0.005) 
0.115 
(0.004) 
-0.029 
(0.004) 
0.216 
45,044 
Notes: Data are from the May CPS supplements for 1973-1981 and the CPS ORO files 
for 1983-1994. Union data are not available in the CPS for !982. RN is regis-
tered nurses; Tech is health technicians; HS is health services occupations; and 
other variables included in the regressions were dummies for other race, region 
(8) and year (19). Results for union membership and hospital correspond to 
those shown in Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
143 
144 JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH 
Appendix 2 
Construction of the Longitudinal Sample from the CPS ORG Files 
T he CPS sample design is such that households are included in 8 surveys ( rotation groups), beginning with 
4 consecutive months in, followed by 8 months out, followed by 4 months in. Outgoing rotation groups 
4 and 8 are asked earnings supplement questions ( weekly earnings, hours, union status, etc.). The CPS 
contains household identification numbers ( ID) and record line numbers, but not individual identifiers. 
Individuals potentially can be identified for the same month in consecutive years; that is, individuals in 
rotation 4 in year 1 can be matched to individuals in rotation 8 in year 2. 
The longitudinal ORG file was created in the following manner. Separate data files were created for 
males and females, and for pairs of years (rotation 4/1983 and rotation 8/1984, rotation 41\984 and rota­
tion 8/1985, etc.). Within each file, individuals were sorted as appropriate on the basis of ascending and 
descending household ID, year, and age. To be considered an acceptable matched pair, a rotation 8 individ­
ual had to be matched with a rotation 4 individual with identical household ID, identical survey month, 
and an age difference between 0 and 2 (since surveys can occur on different days of the month, age change 
need not equal 1 ). Several passes were necessary because a single household may contain more than one 
male or female pair. Checks were provided to insure that only unique matches were selected. For each 
rotation 8 individual, the search was made through all rotation 4 individuals with the same ID to make sure 
there was only I possible match; the file was resorted in reverse order and each selected rotation 4 individ­
ual was checked to insure a unique rotation 8 match. As uniquely matched pairs were identified they were 
removed from the work file. Incorrect changes in the variables marital status, veteran status, race, and edu­
cation ( e. g., a change in schooling other than 0 or I ,  a change from married to never married, etc.) were 
used to delete "bad" observations in households where there were multiple observations and ages too close 
to separate matched pairs. Several passes at the data were made. In households where two pairs of individ­
uals could be separated based on a I year but not the 0 to 2 year age change, a I year criterion was used. If 
a unique pair could not be identified based on these criteria, they were not included in the data set (e.g. ,  
four observations with two identical pairs, or three individuals with two possible matches using the 0 to 2 
age change criterion). 
There are several reasons why matches cannot be made or that individual worker pairs are not 
included in the CPS ORG panel. The principal reasons are if a household moves (thus changing the house­
hold ID), if an individual moves out of a household, if a worker becomes self employed, if an individual 
drops out of the labor market or fails to meet other sample selection criteria, or if the Census is unable to 
reinterview a household and/or receive information on the individual. Inclusion rates for the entire CPS 
ORG panel are just under two-thirds of employed wage and salary workers in any year; rates are some­
what lower in our RN sample. Peracchi and Welch ( 1995) analyze attrition rates among matched March 
CPS files and conclude that age is the most important detenninant of a successful match. Other factors that 
lessen match probabilities are poor health, low schooling, and not a household head, while gender and race 
are unimportant match predictors following control for other factors. Finally, sample sizes are reduced 
further to roughly half the normal size for the 1984/5 panel and to one-quarter for 1985/6 .  This is the result 
of a CPS test sample from July-September 1985 that implemented new population weights. Rotation 4 
households interviewed in July 1984 through September 1985 were not reinterviewed a year later in !985 
and 1986. 
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NOTES 
*The authors appreciate the assistance of David Macpherson, who helped develop the CPS data files used 
in the paper. 
1Calculations from the CPS indicate that nurses (RNs, LPNs, and nursing aides) comprise close to 40 per­
cent of total hospital wage and salary employment. In 1994 , 7 percent of all full-time female wage and 
salary workers were employed in nursing (Employment and Earnings, January 1995, Table 56). 
2Means above the earnings cap are taken from Hirsch and Macpherson (1996, p. 6), who estimate annual 
gender-specific values from the Pareto distribution. Means in nominal dollars are roughly $1,500 for years 
with a $999 cap and $3,000 for years with a $1,923 cap, with moderately higher values for men than 
women and increases in the means over time. 
3Health Technologists and Technicians include clinical laboratory technologists and technicians, dental 
hygienists, health record technologists and technicians, radiologic technicians, licensed practical nurses, 
and health technologists and technicians, n.e.c. Health Service Occupations include dental assistants, 
health aides except nursing, and nursing aides orderlies, and attendants. 
4Log differentials can be converted to approximate percentage differentials by [exp(d)-1] 100, where d is 
the log differential. Information on collective bargaining coverage, defined as all union members plus non­
members who say they are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, is available beginning in 1977. 
Union coverage density is about 2 percentage points higher than is membership density. 
5 A simple specification is used for ease of exposition. Union differential estimates based on separate union 
and nonunion wage equations are highly similar. We do not consider the issue of union endogeneity. Sub­
sequent longitudinal analysis controls for worker specific skills and thus corrects for some forms of selec­
tivity bias. 
6Since sample sizes for the years prior to 1983 are small, we include three-year group dummies for these 
years (197 3-1975 is the omitted group) and separate year dummies for 198 3 and after. 
7Jakubson (1991) finds no evidence that the first differencing technique outlined above is an overly restric­
tive specification of the model when applied to union status. 
8For the comparison groups we include four separate measures for the change in union status. Among 
those who reported changing union status we included separate variables for those who also changed 
occupation and industry, those who changed occupation but not industry, those who changed industry but 
not occupation, and those who changed neither occupation or industry. The coefficients reported in the 
table are for those who changed both occupation and industry. As shown in Hirsch and Schumacher 
(1998), this group is least likely to have changes in union status reported with error and its coefficient pro­
vides the most reliable longitudinal estimate. 
9For a discussion along these lines, see Hirsch and Addison ( 1986). Demsetz (199 3) provides an explicit 
test for this thesis, finding that skill-homogeneous groups are more readily organized than skill-heteroge­
neous groups. We should note that the 1991 decision is not the only one affecting union organizing of 
health care workers. In a 1994 decision, NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America 
(HCR) (92 S. Ct. 1964, 1994), the Supreme Court upheld a federal circuit court decision that LPNs at an 
Ohio nursing home were supervisory employees and not covered by the legal protections of the NLRA. 
Justice Kennedy, author of the 5 -4 majority decision, emphasized that the findings in this case were lim­
ited to health care workers. 
10Register ( 1988) provides evidence finding that union hospitals are more productive than nonunion hospi­
tals. This study is notable because it is one of the few studies that find positive union productivity effects 
in a not-for-profit or relatively noncompetitive sector. 
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